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FINANCING THE PALLISER TRIANGLE, 
1908 .. 1913 
JOHN FELDBERG AND WARREN M. ELOFSON 
A decade ago, David C. Jones compellingly 
described the immense ecological and human 
tragedy that occurred in the southern, semi-
arid districts of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 
the late 191 Os and early 1920s.1 Prior to World 
War I settlers poured into these provinces 
buoyed by dreams of a better life, but in the 
decade or so following 1915 many who had 
taken homesteads in the so-called Palliser 
Triangle saw their hopes shattered by succes-
sive years of drought and crop failure. One of 
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the crucial vehicles in this tragedy was the 
financial institution. Between 1908 and 1913 
investment firms made available huge sums of 
capital mainly from Britain to enable farmers 
to commence and expand their operations. As 
such they helped on the frontier to facilitate 
the ensuing disaster.2 The purpose of this pa-
per is to develop that thesis. It is not, how-
ever, to point the finger of blame. The money 
managers were subject to some of the same 
influences that nourished an overestimation 
of the western frontier by the Canadian gov-
ernment, the Canadian Pacific Railway, and 
indeed, the farmers themselves who clamored 
for loans.3 What follows is simply an attempt 
to shed new light on this major historical event 
by viewing it through the eyes of those who 
he'lped finance it. 
Investment in the Canadian west must be 
seen as a reflection of the fact that in the 
course of the nineteenth century the United 
Kingdom, and in particular the city of Lon-
don, had become the greatest ever inter-
national market for the export of capital. In 
"real" pounds of 1913, total flows to the rest of 
the world grew from an average of 40 million 
pounds per year between 1865 and 1874 to 
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173 million pounds over the decade preced-
ing World War 1.4 The outward movement of 
capital from Britain greatly exceeded that from 
any other country and seems to have accounted 
for between 40 and 75 percent of the total 
from Europe as a whole.s Historians have told 
us about the importance of the philosophy of 
British economic imperialism in channeling 
investment to the more independent states of 
the empire. That theory was based on the be-
lief that the empire was "no longer held to-
gether by diplomatic bonds but by the financial 
commitments made by many influential Brit-
ish investors."6 Successive governments in 
England had made, and had encouraged the 
private sector to make, investments in the 
more independent dominions such as Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand in part because it 
was felt that economic ties would bolster the 
mother country's influence where it was being 
eroded in the strictly political sense. In the 
case of Canada, Britain's perceived need to 
compete with a growing American presence 
seems to have been crucial. "From the British 
angle, a politically independent, but economi-
cally dependent, Canada was an excellent off-
set to the rising power of th~ United States on 
the American continent, and brought both 
political and material gains."7 
Thus by the time the prairie wheat lands 
were being settled and expanded after the turn 
of the twentieth century there was already in 
place an ideology, a tradition, and an infra-
structure for the exportation of British capi-
tal. However, in the period from 1908 to 1913, 
the flow of capital from the mother country to 
the prairie wheat farmers also involved a num-
ber of both "push" and "pull" forces that had 
at least as much to do with immediate eco-
nomic circumstances on both sides of the At-
lantic as with long-standing theories of empire. 
To British money managers, these forces 
strengthened the appeal of investment abroad 
in general while making the western wheat 
frontier seem more inviting than perhaps it 
was.8 
Among the push factors one of the most 
important was the accumulation of enormous 
pools of excess capital. The traditional imbal-
ance in income distribution in British society 
had concentrated the country's wealth in an 
extremely limited number of hands. That cir-
cumstance tended in the first place to sub-
stantially restrict the purchasing power of the 
nation's largest consumer group-the wage 
earner-and produced chronic undercon-
sumption.9 The result by the turn of the twen-
tieth century was a slowing of economic 
growth across the British Isles in manufactur-
ing businesses that produced for the domestic 
market. This, in conjunction with the rela-
tive maturity and therefore capital self-suffi-
ciency of many long-established corporations, 
led to a more or less consistent shrinking of 
credit requirements in industry. 10 At the same 
time, the agricultural sector in Britain, pre-
viously considered reliable as an outlet for 
capital, was experiencing economic difficul-
ties that had originated in the 1870s in part 
because of foreign competition. As a result, 
investment companies had become much 
more reluctant to provide conventional farm 
mortgages. ll Furthermore, opportunities to fi-
nance government debt were dwindling by 
the turn of the century. Successive British 
ministries had attempted to cut down on bor-
rowing and therefore had significantly re-
duced offerings of one of the safest and in 
some respects most attractive domestic invest-
ments available, the government bond or 
"consol."12 
The consequence of contracting domestic 
investment markets for British money man-
agers was that their capital concentrations 
continued to grow inordinately prior to World 
War 1. This quite naturally produced a rather 
dramatic fall in interest rates as is evidenced 
by the fact that, for instance, the consols the 
government made available were yielding less 
than 3 percent by the 1890s.13 The combina-
tion of limited domestic opportunities and 
low returns created nothing less than a 
scramble to find opportunities abroad. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century over one-
half of the savings of British citizens was be-
ing invested outside the country.14 
FINANCING THE PALLISER TRIANGLE 259 
TABLE 1 
BRITISH INVESTMENT IN CANADA, 1900-13, 
















As Table 1 demonstrates, 1908 marked a dra-
matic increase in British investment in Canada 
and the amount continued to climb almost 
steadily to 1913. In the years just prior to the 
war Britons were investing more money in 
North America than anywhere else in the 
world, and 75 percent of that was going to 
Canada. 16 There were two basic reasons for 
this. First, by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the United States and Australia, the two 
countries that had previously attracted the 
majority of British capital, had become much 
more self-financing. 17 Second, this was the 
great period of expansion in western Canada 
associated with the opening of commercial 
wheat production on the prairies and other 
industrial developments. 18 
The wheat industry was one of the two great 
western Canadian outlets for British capital 















in these years; the other was railway construc-
tion. 19 What sets investment in the former 
apart from that in the latter, however, is the 
amount of risk involved. Britons generally rec-
ognized that anyone putting money into rail-
ways enjoyed insulation from major losses by 
what seemed almost unlimited government 
guarantees and support.20 The wheat frontier 
offered no similar risk protection to investors 
and yet they put their money into it with com-
parable impunity. It should be said that 
straightforward mathematical calculation un-
doubtedly played an important part in draw-
ing British capital to western agriculture. 
Demand for loans among the new settlers was 
tremendous and money managers discovered 
that, at a time when demand was drying up in 
other areas both at home and abroad, they 
could command mortgage interest rates as high 
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as 8, 10, and in some cases, even 12 percent.21 
The return on many domestic investments 
listed on the London markets in the prewar 
years was often no higher than 1 percent.22 It 
was possible, therefore, for investors to bor-
row funds in London and loan them out in 
western Canada at a substantial profit. 
If investor enthusiasm was a reflection of 
high interest rates on the frontier as well as 
falling demand in other parts of the world, it 
was also predicated on a belief that great things 
were about to happen in this new hinterland. 
The prairie economy appeared to hold out 
wonderful prospects for future prosperity in 
part because of the growing appeal of wheat 
around the world. Per capita consumption rose 
from 2.46 bushels in 1885, to 2.81 bushels in 
1909, and between 1906 and 1913 the price, 
after remaining more or less steady for over a 
decade, climbed steadily from about $1.00 to 
around $1.50 per bushel.23 Moreover, the in-
crease in demand coincided with a period of 
lower agricultural production throughout 
much of Europe because of the difficulties farm-
ers were having competing with foreign pro-
ducers.24 The result was a growing need for the 
importation of wheat in many European na-
tions to feed rising populations. 2S This brought 
a new appreciation of wheat as a staple com-
modity and subsequently produced a general 
tendency to overestimate the value and sta-
bility of frontiers that seemed likely to pro-
duce it in large quantities. "Everyone knows 
that wheat is on the same basis as gold," re-
ported one writer in the Economist in early 
1910.26 Some two years later, when referring 
specifically to the Canadian west, the presi-
dent of the Trust and Loan Company of 
Canada advised his shareholders that "when 
they [have] those vast areas of fertile soil, pro-
ducing annually immense crops of the neces-
sities of life, it [is] impossible to doubt the 
stability" of the entire countryY 
Readily available export figures for Canada 
in the prewar era indicated an increasingly 
productive agricultural base consistently ex-
panding with no sign of an end.28 This seems 
to have made financial institutions in Britain 
positively euphoric about the potential of the 
west. Their inclination to go overboard, so to 
speak, and invest without awaiting the evi-
dence of time no doubt reflected their natural 
propensity to rationalize in face of the specific 
circumstances outlined above. However, a sort 
of "frontier mentality" also came into play.z9 
Western Canada seemed to have an almost 
unlimited amount of virgin soils and its po-
tential was as yet unknown. Therefore, people 
had difficulty keeping their estimation of it 
within the bounds of reality. When encour-
aged by stable grain prices or favorable inter-
est rates to believe that the region would be 
fruitful, they began to see the prairies, stretch-
ing from Manitoba to the Rockies and four 
hundred miles north of the forty-ninth paral-
lel, as "one huge wheat field" that was certain 
to have a substantial impact on "the food sup-
plies of the world in the future."3o In the Brit-
ish House of Commons both government and 
opposition acknowledged the "vast untouched 
areas and fertile regions ... the British Empire 
possesses" in western Canada and they ac-
cepted without hesitation estimates that those 
regions had "the capacity ... for the growth of 
four times the quantity of wheat required to 
feed the whole people of the United King-
dom."3! 
Among the lenders, this overestimation 
helped produce a rather surreal faith in the 
Canadian west that was difficult to temper. 
We see this in their unwillingness to believe 
that the basic security for investment, the land 
itself, could significantly lose its equity value. 
During the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, the rate of appreciation was nothing short 
of spectacular. Between 1900 and 1910 it 
amounted to 123 percent in Manitoba, 185 
percent in Alberta, and 201 percent in 
Saskatchewan.32 A fundamental knowledge of 
economic trends in the other recently settled 
frontiers of Australia and the United States 
might have indicated that these rises could be 
followed by substantial falls. 33 However, few 
were prepared to give this much real thought. 
"Farm lands are increasing in value steadily," 
wrote the Financial Post in 1911, "and will 
continue to do so in proportion to the in-
crease in immigration which is phenomenal at 
present."34 Whether it would be possible to 
sustain the dramatic upward momentum for 
much longer was a point of considerable de-
bate, but even some of the most guarded prog-
nosticators argued that at worst, farmland in 
the west would be likely to avoid excessive 
declines.35 In the Palliser Triangle plummet-
ing land values, which were to accompany a 
decade of drought starting in 1916, were soon 
to demonstrate just how misguided such as-
sumptions could be. 
Equally chimerical was the confidence 
shown in science and technology on the west-
ern frontier as a means to overcome any and 
all deficiencies of climate, terrain and soil. 
When they had seen enough of this country to 
realize its flaws, many people did not moder-
ate their initial enthusiasm but insisted that 
new techniques would not only overcome 
natural barriers but in fact would turn them 
into great material advantages. "With produc-
tive resources steadily increasing in the form 
. of better implements of agriculture, better rail-
road facilities and the extending area of 
civilisation," they insisted, "there is no doubt 
whatsoever but that the debt the West is as-
suming is a light one."36 The "cultivation of 
wheat in the Canadian West has been greatly 
promoted by the multiplication of railways and 
the improvement of implements, including the 
introduction of traction engines and steam 
ploughs."37 One of the problems farmers had 
was the short growing season and the conse-
quent possibility of crop failures due to frost. 
The introduction of new, faster-maturing 
strains of wheat such as Red Fife and Marquis 
significantly alleviated doubts on that score. 
Indeed, by 1912 it experts confidently pre-
dicted that these strains would allow the regu-
lar harvesting of wheat in the central and even 
northern parts of Alberta and Saskatchewan, 
thus making the entire west far more produc-
tive than anyone had ever dreamed.38 "The 
area of land capable of growing wheat in the 
West is constantly expanding as hardier vari-
eties are evolved .... [T]he pioneer finds that 
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the country in latitudes once deemed hope-
lessly cold and sterile is quite as fit for farming 
as that further south," wrote a contributor to 
the Economist. 39 Since that time, of course, 
early frosts have continued to devastate crops 
from Calgary to Peace River. 
Science, advocates of the west argued, 
would eventually conquer other problems as 
well. From early on some observers were warn-
ing of possible difficulties as a result of soil 
exhaustion and abuse. Many farmers were pro-
ducing valuable cash wheat crops from the 
same cultivated acres year after year with little 
regard for weed control or for preserving nu-
tritional and moisture levels for the future. 4o 
Yet concerns were mollified by assurances that 
eventually an advanced system of crop rota-
tion, through a mixed instead of straight grain-
farming approach, would not only save the 
land but enable it to bring forth wheat crops 
indefinitely. Even "if the present money result 
was no greater," it was argued, "mixed farming 
in which ... crops are partly used on the farm 
to feed stock, would so sustain the value of the 
land as to pay handsomely in the long run."41 
Some analysts claimed that while the earlier-
established districts in the south might be 
forced to reduce total wheat production for a 
time while making the transition to mixed 
farming, the slack would be taken up by the 
more remote areas as the new strains of wheat 
became available. "It is tolerably certain," they 
estimated, "that the older west ... will before 
long take to mixed farming, leaving the re-
gion to the north of existing settlements to be 
the wheat-belt for the future."42 Thus the Ca-
nadian west in general was certain to remain a 
dynamic, prosperous, and secure agricultural 
region, and fears about the potential and value 
of any particular parts were cast aside. 
Such predictions overlooked the natural 
environment of the southern Canadian plains. 
Mixed farming on a large scale was and is im-
possible in much of this area mainly because 
the climate and other elements are not con-
ducive to animal husbandry.43 There are not 
enough freshwater sloughs, lakes, and streams 
to water livestock, nor sufficient annual 
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precipitation to produce adequate pastures, 
roughage hay, or greenfeed crops. Science was 
simply a placebo to overcome the doubts of 
men who wanted to believe they had a mar-
velous new region in which to invest: it was 
hailed as a means of overcoming major prob-
lems such as inadequate rainfall in the Palliser 
Triangle. In this case the answer was the 
Campbellite method of dry-farming, which 
mistakenly advocated deep plowing of the soil, 
subsurface packing, and frequent cultivation 
to draw up moisture from the depth of the 
earth through capillary action.44 Misguided 
faith in this approach and in advancements in 
the technique of summer fallowing made at 
the experimental research farm at Indian 
Head, Saskatchewan, induced confidence that 
the entire southern plains could in fact go on 
increasing output more or less forever. 45 
The farmers themselves must have shared 
this view. When they completed the proving-
up requirement on their homesteads, they con-
tiIlUed to increase their demands for capital. 
"It is the man without money who is forced on 
to the free lands and to the hardships of home-
steading," an article quite rightly pointed out. 
"When the land does become his property, 
after complying with the requirements of the 
homestead law, he is, generally speaking, ready 
for a substantial loan and he generally bor-
rows all he can."46 The settlers had lots of uses 
for leverage. They bought more land or re-
placed "the team of oxen with horses" or aban-
doned the sod shack in favor of a proper wood-
frame dwellingY 
As dreams of prosperity on the frontier, the 
desire to invest, and the demand for money 
came together between late 1908 and 1913, 
capital poured into the Canadian west.48 The 
importance of overseas money was eagerly ac-
knowledged by the press. "A great deal of the 
expansion in Western Canada has been fi-
nanced by mortgage and loan companies 
which have lent large sums, secured in the 
most part in Great Britain, on farm land and 
town lot mortgages," the Financial Post ob-
served. "These companies [have] been profit-
able to stockholders . . . [and] have been 
instrumental in the development of the 
West."49 A number of investment vehicles 
were used to unite borrowers and lenders: ex-
isting trust and loan companies shifted their 
business into the region and new joint stock 
companies and syndicates were formed to so-
licit capital. It did not take Canadian inter-
ests long to participate in importing British 
capital once they realized the profits they 
could make. Companies such as the Canada 
Permanent found they could raise capital by 
placing five-year debentures on the British 
markets at a comparatively low rate of be-
tween 3'/2 and 4 percent. 50 New companies 
were often formed as joint operations of Ca-
nadian and overseas partners. Usually local 
investors would assemble a corporation whose 
directorate included one or more prominent 
Britons. The Canadians then traveled to Brit-
ain in the hopes of raising funds, using their 
relationship with their associate to enhance 
the general reputation of the corporation.5' 
The fund-raising could be done either through 
stock or debenture issues, or through private 
placements with individuals. Syndicates were 
also formed that consisted of small groups of 
businessmen who raised capital issuing shares. 
This often obliged British affiliates to call on 
their families, friends, and business col-
leagues. 52 Larger companies generally raised 
capital on the stock or money markets. 
It would be wrong to suggest that in Great 
Britain all financial interests were caught up 
in the general enthusiasm for these ventures. 
Edinburgh was the preferred source for corpo-
rations' fund-raising on the open markets be-
cause there was some resistance to debentures 
ofloan and mortgage corporations in England. 
English reticence centered on the fact that 
the bonds of such companies were infre-
quently traded on the capital markets and 
therefore were relatively difficult to liqui-
date;53 Nonetheless, there was undeniably a 
great interest in Britain as a whole in bank-
rolling the western Canadian frontier. In 1890 
there were only seven British companies op-
erating in this country. By 1914 fifty new Brit-
ish investment firms had moved to Canada. 
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TABLE 2 
LOAN COMPANIES OPERATING IN ALBERTA 
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 190955 
Company Name 
Alberta Societe Anonyme Belge 
British Columbia Permanent 
Colonial Investment 
Colonial Investment (Winnipeg) 
Canada Landed 
Credit Foncier 
Canadian Loan and Realty 
Canada Permanent 
Dominion Permanent Loan 
Edmonton Mortgage Corporation 
Empire Loan 
Great West Permanent 
Guelph and Ontario 
Investors Guarantee 
London and Canadian Loan Company 
McDougall and Secord 
North of Scotland Mortgage Company 
Ontario Loan and Debenture 
Reliance Loan and Savings 
Royal Loan and Savings 
Sun and Hastings 
Trust and Loan Company of Canada 
Union Trust Company 
Of these, twenty-one were formed directly as 
mortgage companies or trust and loan compa-
nies involved in mortgage extensions. The 
other twenty-nine operated as general invest-
ment firms, making loans to industry as well as 
to the agricultural sector. Only two restricted 
their activities to eastern Canada; the others 
operated either primarily or exclusively in the 
west. 54 
A list of the expenditures of the major 

























1909 (see Table 2) indicates not only the enor-
mous amount of capital that was being in-
jected into the province by this time but also 
of the confidence that money managers in 
general placed in western farm mortgages. In 
addition to the trust, loan, and mortgage com-
panies, moreover, many life insurance firms 
participated. 56 Many of these, especially those 
conducting business in Scotland, had invested 
heavily in agricultural mortgages in the pastY 
The insurance firms were swept along by the 
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same faith in the Canadian frontier that their 
competitors had. The "return on loans secured 
by western 'improved' lands is so high," re-
ported the Post, "and the likelihood of depre-
ciation in the value of the land is so remote, 
that such institutions as do not require ready 
convertibility for large portions of their funds, 
find them particularly desirable."58 
The corporations entered the frontier ei-
ther by setting up branches in one or more of 
the major western Canadian urban centers or 
by making arrangements with a financial in-
stitution already established. In 1909 the 
Standard Life Assurance Company made ar-
rangements with the Winnipeg-based Royal 
Trust Company whereby the former agreed to 
devote a specified portion of its assets to farm 
mortgages, principally in Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba. The entrance of this major British 
corporation ushered in an unprecedented in-
flux of old world insurance capital into the 
Canadian agricultural sector. Assets oflife in-
surance companies in the three prairie prov-
inces as a whole rose to a total of $48,364,000 
by 1909 and $70,113,000 by 1911.59 
Of course, the Canadian chartered banks 
were also involved in financing the western 
farmers. 6o Indeed, the banks were strained to 
the limit in attempting to meet the demand 
on the prairies and they too found ways to 
increase their presence as the investment rush 
proceeded. 61 On 7 January 1911 the Financial 
Post reported that the Canadian banks had 
constructed twenty-six new branches in 
Alberta, sixty-nine in Saskatchewan, and 
thirteen in Manitoba. At that time, 118 Ca-
nadian chartered bank branches were operat-
ing in the three prairie provinces out of a 
total of 256 in the entire country.62 It should 
be noted, however, that by law the Canadian 
chartered banks were not allowed to take 
mortgages on real estate. Their participation 
was through short-term loans on liquid as-
sets, which in the case of the Triangle were 
the harvested wheat crops. Therefore, the do-
mestic institutions were neither as heavily 
committed nor nearly as vulnerable as the land 
investors. 63 
The growing presence of the Canadian 
banks seems to have bolstered enthusiasm 
abroad by contributing to the image of the 
frontier as a sound, sensible, and potentially 
rewarding outlet for capital.64 At any rate, in-
ternational participation continued to climb 
and new mechanisms were designed to attract 
capital primarily of a private nature. Hence 
the "guaranteed mortgage" was established 
through which the mortgage company would 
negotiate a loan, attend to the administrative 
and legal details, collect the interest and prin-
cipal, and look after the payment of any out-
standing taxes and insurance premiums on 
behalf of an individual or a private institution 
in Britain in exchange for a fixed percentage 
of the interest. One of the advantages of this 
mode to the individual investor was that he 
was able to hold title to the mortgage himself. 
As a consequence the funds were directed into 
a specified asset rather than into a mortgage 
company's general operating account. To make 
the investment doubly attractive, the com-
pany also undertook to guarantee the invest-
ment, even if the value of the land should 
decline.65 
As a result of such expedients investment 
funds continued to flow in. "The desire to 
meet the demand is strong because during the 
past year, and the past twenty years, the farm 
loans have been thoroughly satisfactory," it 
was pointed out in early 1910. "Managers of 
the older companies which have had large sums 
invested for over twenty years say that losses 
are quite rare and immaterial and that interest 
payments are well kept Up."66 Many firms 
shared these sentiments.67 In February 1910 
the London and Canadian Loan Company 
announced that as a result of the active de-
mand for money at favorable interest rates, it 
was increasing its mortgage activity.68 New 
capital also began to arrive from European 
countries other than Great Britain. In April 
1910 a Canadian directorate based in Edmon-
ton announced that it had made arrangements 
with a group of financiers in France to bring 
$2 million into western Canada to be made 
available for mortgages. The new company 
would be known as the Caisse Hypothecaire 
Canadienne, or the Canadian Mortgage Com-
pany.69 
The 1910 wheat crop was one of the worst 
on record but the financial community was 
undeterred. Reflecting on the character of the 
settlers, the Financial Post noted that "though 
they had a drought, those who live in this 
country ... know that though they be unfor-
tunate in some years, others come around 
which compensate them for the loss. "70 The 
poor crop year actually increased loan com-
pany business; many farmers, finding that crop 
failures had left them desperately short of 
capital for the winter, were forced to seek 
loans to sustain them until the next harvest. 
Some who were fortunate enough to have a 
crop were anxious to finance improvements 
to their homesteads and buy more land. Oth-
ers wanted to payoff what they had already 
bought. 71 Because the financial institutions 
continued to increase their offerings, the poor 
harvest had no discernible adverse effect on 
land values. "The country has demonstrated 
itself beyond any shadow of a doubt," it was 
announced. "[Because] only the remnants of 
the condition which tended to keep the price 
of land down remain, ... we realise that there 
is an end to the supply."72 
Reasoning of this sort gave many a danger-
ous sense of well-being. They clung to the be-
lief that the western frontier was endowed with 
special qualities making it impervious to forces 
that had operated elsewhere. Thus, for in-
stance, in an interview with the Calgary Her-
ald, S. H. Mapes, the head of the Metropolitan 
Security Company, acknowledged that in "the 
eastern states, and in fact in all older coun-
tries, the value of a property mortgaged has a 
tendency to decrease in value." However, "in 
these western provinces, a tendency all the 
time is for the property to improve in value."73 
In his 1911 annual report, W. G. Gooderham 
noted that, out of$4 million outstanding, there 
were practically no debts in arrears. "The 
prompt payment of interest and principal," he 
said, "is very characteristic of Western bor-
rowers, and is another desirable feature of the 
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loaning business in Western Canada."74 Of 
course he did not concede that when credit is 
readily available it is usually the case that few 
people fail to meet their obligations if only 
because they are able to borrow more money. 
Companies indicated that pressure for credit 
was so high they were forced to turn away 
clients. 75 With such an excess of demand over 
supply, it was not long before additional 
sources of finance presented themselves. Some 
of these were firms entering the west for the 
first time. In April 1911, Douglas Fortayne, 
the managing director of the Netherlands 
Transatlantic Mortgage Company, publicized 
the fact that his company was coming to 
Canada to invest in Manitoba, Alberta, and 
Saskatchewan. Supported by two of the stron-
gest banks in Holland, it planned to lend at 
least $1 million annually for farm mortgages. 76 
It joined three other Dutch-based companies 
(the Holland-Canada Mortgage Company, the 
Netherlands Mortgage Bank of Canada, and 
the Rotterdam-Canada Mortgage Company) 
already operating on the Canadian prairies. 
By late 1912, together with another Dutch 
company (the Overseas Mortgage Company 
established in 1912), it had inj ected over 
$10,400,000 into the western Canadian 
economy.77 At the same time, some of the 
British firms already in western Canada found 
ways to generate more capital. The Trust and 
Loan Company of Canada announced that it 
was issuing an entirely new series of stock. It 
stated that "the proposed new capital would 
be invested chiefly and almost entirely in 
Saskatchewan and Alberta. "78 The directors 
felt confident in this move because they were 
investing in "not only the most remunerative 
bllt also the safest part of Canada, namely the 
new ... [wheat] lands in the West."79 The 
confidence in the region demonstrated by this 
company and several other European firms did 
not go unnoticed by the financial press. In 
December 1911 the Financial Post observed 
that "from Europe, especially, this year there 
has been a steady flow of money .... In addi-
tion to the enterprise of Dutch, Belgian and 
French Investors, Britishers appear to have 
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awakened to a greater extent than usual to the 
opportuni ties in the Canadian West. "80 
The positive outlook with respect to the 
Canadian prairies continued to flourish 
throughout the latter part of 1911 and into 
1912.81 It was not until toward the end of 1912 
that the old world sense of urgency about in-
vesting in the west began to diminish for the 
long term. By then some four-fifths of the pat-
ented land on the prairies had been mort-
gaged.8z The most important reason for the 
decline appears to have been that demand for 
capital for industrial expansion and military 
development prior to and during World War I 
caused a rise in interest rates in Europe. 83 This 
encouraged money managers to channel more 
investment into the home market. It did not, 
however, provide for a mass exodus from 
Canada. Professor Jones demonstrated that 
when drought struck the Palliser Triangle in 
1916, the financial institutions were caught 
with loans on crops that did not grow and 
acreages that were more or less worthless.84 
The McGibbon Commission, assembled to 
investigate the disaster in Alberta, supported 
the farmers' belief that the banks had gone 
"beyond liberality" and "granted altogether too 
much credit."85 It should be reiterated that 
the farmers themselves had almost certainly 
been influenced by the same visions of success 
on the frontier as had the companies to which 
they had thronged for capital. 
The institutions were drawn (and pushed) 
to the prairies by a complex set of circum-
stances, some of which had originated in parts 
of the world that were far removed from west-
ern Canada. It is clear, however, that the fron-
tier itself, working on the imagination, 
reinforced all these circumstances. Professor 
Douglas Francis has demonstrated that the de-
veloping Canadian west stirred dreams of para-
dise not only in settlers, the government, and 
the Canadian Pacific Railway but also in a 
host of writers, poets, and artists.86 Painting 
by painting, poem by poem, story by story, 
people with well-known names including 
Kinderdine, Jeffreys, Murphy, and Connor 
constructed a myth about a wonderful land 
that was to be not only more stable and pros-
perous than any that had come before but also 
healthier, wiser, and more free. There was no 
compelling pragmatic reason for creating such 
a picture. These people could have made just 
as great an impact by unveiling a wild land full 
of real hardships and incalculable dangers. 
However, it seems to be human nature that 
when one finds oneself standing at the thresh-
old of a frontier one feels a strong proclivity to 
visualize utopia. Unless some striking nega-
tives assert themselves, caution is lost as the 
best-case scenario develops into a widely ac-
cepted expectation. In 1910 an observer writ-
ing specifically for the banking audience in 
Canada commented: 
The world's gaze and capital are being di-
rected towards what is unquestionably the 
richest country in the world .... I have 
seen ... [the banks in the west] open up a 
branch in a townsite where but a few build-
ings had sprung up ... using for an office a 
tent or a board shack. . . . [I]t is not the 
building nor the name of the bank that wins 
out, but rather the man at the helm, the 
man who understands Western ways, he who 
extends the glad hand and says, "come in 
friend we want your business."87 
These words express the widespread exuber-
ance for the frontier during the settlement 
period and provide direct evidence that it 
helped to inspire the financial fraternity, along 
with almost everyone else, to reason away cau-
tion in the wheat fields of the west. 
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